

National security policy in Ukraine: a change in the system of power relations of the modern world

Política de seguridad nacional en Ucrania: un cambio en el sistema de relaciones de poder del mundo moderno

Authors

Ivan V. Yakoviyk¹, Denys A. Chyzhov², Nina I. Karpachova³, Svitlana V. Hlushchenko⁴, Yuliia O. Chaliuk⁵

¹European Union Law Department, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Kharkiv, Ukraine (yakoviyk_iv@ukr.net)

²Department the Private Law, Institute of Management and Law, Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Kharkiv, Ukraine (denys_chizhov@ukr.net)

³Department of General Legal Disciplines, Law and Management Institute (Kyiv), Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University, Kyiv, Ukraine (first_ombudsman@gmail.com)

⁴State Judicial Administration of Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine (hluscenko@i.ua)

⁵Department of Sociology, Personnel Management, Sociology and Psychology Faculty, Kyiv National Economic University named after Vadym Hetman, Kyiv, Ukraine (Lamur4ik007@gmail.com)

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Abstract

The article deals with the problems of finding ways to increase the effectiveness of government national security policy in the system of power relations of the modern world. The author reveals the essence and public administration nature of such phenomena as “national security of the state”, “national security policy”, “national security of Ukraine”. The study analyses the approaches to shaping modern national security policy of Ukraine, as well as its organizational and legal support. The system of the most urgent threats to the national security of Ukraine is revealed. The author concludes that the current legislative support of government policy in this area does not meet the needs of overcoming most of these threats. It is emphasized that Ukraine must resume its activity in offering its own armaments, military equipment and peacekeeping contingent for the needs of the UN and other international organizations; create a new geopolitical space in the regions of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea, becoming a regional leader there. An important area of the national security policy is the fight against agents of influence of the Russian Federation, which currently occupy an important place in the system of economic and even public administration relations in Ukraine. The author proved the need to expand the contours of security policy in Ukraine by developing and implementing more active (aggressive) mechanisms aimed not only at counteracting external threats, but also at promoting their own national and civilizational interests in the geopolitical space. The need to introduce branch, sectoral, regional state programs of development of separate segments of the system of national security of Ukraine is studied. The article also emphasizes the need to develop a system of indicators to counter agents of influence of foreign countries abounding in the political environment of Ukraine. At the same time, the author defends the position on the need to introduce mirror mechanisms and tools to combat external threats, including in a hybrid, nonlinear war against Ukraine.

Keywords: National Security, National Interest, National Security Policy, Organizational and Legal Support, Hybrid War, Geopolitical Leadership.



Resumen

El artículo trata sobre los problemas de encontrar formas de incrementar la efectividad de la política de seguridad nacional del gobierno en el sistema de relaciones de poder del mundo moderno. El autor revela la esencia y la naturaleza de la administración pública de fenómenos tales como "seguridad nacional del estado", "política de seguridad nacional", "seguridad nacional de Ucrania". El estudio analiza los enfoques para dar forma a la política de seguridad nacional moderna de Ucrania, así como su apoyo organizativo y legal. Se revela el sistema de las amenazas más urgentes a la seguridad nacional de Ucrania. El autor concluye que el actual apoyo legislativo a la política gubernamental en esta área no responde a las necesidades de superar la mayoría de estas amenazas. Se enfatiza que Ucrania debe reanudar su actividad ofreciendo su propio armamento, equipo militar y contingente de mantenimiento de la paz para las necesidades de la ONU y otras organizaciones internacionales; crear un nuevo espacio geopolítico en las regiones de Europa del Este y el Mar Negro, convirtiéndose en un líder regional allí. Un área importante de la política de seguridad nacional es la lucha contra los agentes de influencia de la Federación de Rusia, que actualmente ocupan un lugar importante en el sistema de relaciones económicas e incluso de la administración pública en Ucrania. El autor demostró la necesidad de ampliar los contornos de la política de seguridad en Ucrania mediante el desarrollo e implementación de mecanismos más activos (agresivos) destinados no solo a contrarrestar las amenazas externas, sino también a promover sus propios intereses nacionales y de civilización en el espacio geopolítico. Se estudia la necesidad de introducir programas estatales regionales, sectoriales y regionales de desarrollo de segmentos separados del sistema de seguridad nacional de Ucrania. El artículo también enfatiza la necesidad de desarrollar un sistema de indicadores para contrarrestar los agentes de influencia de países extranjeros que abundan en el entorno político de Ucrania. Al mismo tiempo, el autor defiende la posición sobre la necesidad de introducir mecanismos y herramientas espejo para combatir las amenazas externas, incluso en una guerra híbrida y no lineal contra Ucrania.

Palabras clave: Seguridad Nacional, Interés Nacional, Política de Seguridad Nacional, Apoyo Organizacional y Legal, Guerra Híbrida, Liderazgo Geopolítico.



Introduction

The development of geopolitical relations in the modern world is objectified by current global problems that directly or indirectly affect all countries in the world. Terrorist threats, hybrid wars, the global pandemic, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and the radicalization of national minorities are all threats to the modern national security strategy of any state. For Ukraine, unfortunately, all the above risks are not only real, but also those that exist in the country, and which are opposed by both the political leaders and the civil sector, civil society. Therefore, Ukraine needs to constantly update its national security strategy, a set of measures to ensure it, as well as to constantly create the conditions to increase the effectiveness of organizational and legal support of the entire national security system. It should be assumed that several subjects of international law are pursuing an aggressive foreign policy against Ukraine, and therefore talking about Russia's aggression only is no longer correct in terms of the needs of the geopolitical subjectivity of Ukraine. Changes in the system of power relations in the modern world, the displacement of major geopolitical centers — all this leads to new circumstances and conditions in which the current political leaders of Ukraine must implement Ukraine's own national security strategy, which should not be characterized solely by defensive methods of maintaining domestic political and socio-economic stability of the security environment in Ukraine. The modern world is facing many challenges, which require not so much a protective response as countermeasures, counter-attacks in order to eliminate not the problems themselves, but the risk factors that cause these problems.

In this context, our goal is to propose a new contour of the national security policy in Ukraine, taking into account the most notable global trends in international relations to overcome global geopolitical problems. The biggest geopolitical players are trying to maintain their spheres of influence, expand markets for their own economies, as well as create systems of dependent subjects of international relations and alliances of countries that will provide the necessary potential for socio-economic development for their metropolises. The dominance of global paternalism in the modern world reaches a new level, implementing the main determinants that bring maximum effect to global decision-making centers in the concept of liberal democracy, which are translated to other countries, becoming the main trend of socio-political and socio-economic relations at the national level. For Ukraine, this development trend needs to be adjusted, because in the current geopolitical environment Ukraine has the opportunity to become a regional leader. For this purpose, there is a need to revise the current concept and model of the

national security policy in terms of risks that are most relevant to our country.

This article intends to offer a new contour of the strategic vision of national security policy, identifying the most current trends of changing the palette of global and regional threats to Ukraine not only today, but also in the tactical future.

Achieving this goal requires fulfilling the following objectives:

- 1) reveal modern doctrinal approaches to shaping national security policy;
- 2) identify the most pressing problems of the current state of the national security policy in Ukraine;
- 3) on the basis of the analysis present new guidelines, propose new mechanisms, and represent a modern system of restrictions and acceptable indicators of the expansion of state instruments to ensure national security under the modern conditions.

The main focus should be not only on countering threats, but also on developing preventive measures to overcome the potential consequences of intensifying new global and regional risks to national security.

Materials and methods

The study of the peculiarities of the development of national security policy is based on a wide range of analytical material and critical research by foreign and Ukrainian researchers: Antonov (2018), De Maio (2016), Klimenko (2018), Ruban (2019), Stukalin (2016) and others.

Much attention in modern research on the transformation of the paradigm of public administration of the security sector in Ukraine is paid to the issue of effective counteraction to Russian aggression. In particular, Briand (2017) and Bryc (2019) emphasize that in order to effectively counter Russian aggression, Ukraine must join a global security network or regional security alliances. But according to experts, the main problem is that quite stable alliances have formed in the region of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea: NATO, the CSTO, the Bucharest Group. Joining them will mean a civilized choice. Ukraine has announced its policy for NATO membership. But not being in the alliance requires finding new configurations in the field of building a security environment at the regional level.

Lee (2017) and Matsaberidze (2015) are worth noting, which emphasize the need for Ukraine to find powerful allies. However, researchers are almost unanimous in their conclusions that such allies can be either the United States or the EU as a

whole. They consider the “Ukrainian crisis” as a continuation of the Cold War, its new stage. Therefore, it is a systemic confrontation of two civilizational paths of development: liberal-democratic and authoritarian-totalitarian. In this context, researchers emphasize that since Ukraine has gained independence and excluded itself from the orbit of Russia’s interests, it is quite logical to direct the vector of foreign policy, including security policy, towards Western Europe and the United States.

Instead, there is another point of view. In particular, Ben-Ami (2017) emphasizes the need for Ukraine to build its own regional system of relations in the security sector. This will increase Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Researcher agrees that Ukraine should unite the countries of the regions of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin around the idea of countering global challenges and threats from Russia.

Georgiou and Rocco (2017) support the same point of view, but in a slightly different aspect. ST and others. Researchers come to the conclusion about the need to develop a strong economic sector in Ukraine, which will be the basis for further building a system of security relations in the region. The scholars believe that modern mechanisms for shaping state security are in the plane of building a self-sufficient, independent economy within the state, which will be a source of increasing state revenues to be used to finance the national security system.

An important element of the study of the analysed issues is the study of legislative, organizational and legal support for shaping and practical implementation of the national security policy. In particular, the main emphasis is placed on a system and critical analysis of such regulations as the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine” (Legislation of Ukraine, 2018); Decrees of the President of Ukraine “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of September 2, 2015 ‘On the New Version of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine’”; “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of January 27, 2016 ‘On the Cyber Security Strategy of Ukraine’”; “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine of May 6, 2015 ‘On the National Security Strategy of Ukraine’” (Legislation of Ukraine, 2015a; 2015b; 2016b), etc.

The methodological framework of the study involved both general and special research methods that are most effective for understanding the legal field, in particular the functioning of the system and mechanisms for ensuring the national security of Ukraine. The greatest efficiency was achieved due to the successful combination of different methods of scientific knowledge implemented within a

system approach, which allowed approaching the issue of determining the effectiveness of this policy in the most comprehensive way. The structure functional method allowed studying as thoroughly as possible the problem of the essence, structure, forms and content of the national security policy, as well as investigating the real state and problems of its current implementation.

The research methodology itself is characterized by consistent study and knowledge of the essence and nature of such phenomena as “national security of the state”, “national security policy”, “national security of Ukraine”. The analysis of the organizational and legal support of the national security policy of Ukraine was carried out, its shortcomings were identified, and the ways to improve efficiency were proposed, which were further tested for utilitarianism and rationality through the review of research in this field.

Results

National security is one of the most complex objects of public administration. It is an extremely extensive system of interconnected elements that constantly respond to changes in the external and internal environment. Because of this, the state needs not only almost unlimited resources to fulfil national security objectives, but also the available capacity to constantly meet the permanently emerging new challenges and threats. As an object of public administration, national security should be interpreted as an unstable object, i.e. one that is in constant dynamics under the influence of a system of external and internal environmental factors. The main difficulty in its stabilization is that it is quite difficult to determine with a high probability the time limits when the main goals of national security policies will be achieved. And after their achievement, they [results of the national policy and the desired state of national security] are constantly maintained, because those forces that influence the national security system do so as adaptively as the system of public administration influence on it develops. In other words, it is impossible to achieve a state of national security once and for all. This is an object of public administration that requires constant governmental influence.

Peculiarities of government influence on the national security system are revealed as maximum as possible in its interaction with other states on the international arena. We talked about global and regional risks of public, political and socio-economic development, which are constant and by their nature are mostly artificial, created by other actors in international relations in order to expand their spheres of influence at the expense of states, or rather socio-economic environment of the state. We consciously say that the source and generator of external, in relation to the system of national



security, risks are not only other states, but also such subjects of international relations as actors who have the necessary resources, organizational and institutional capabilities (TNCs, international and regional organizations, alliances, etc.). All this determines both the nature of state policy and the need to form a system of national security, not only as its object, but as a desirable condition of functioning of the state as a whole. That is, we say that the security environment, due to its dynamism and instability, forms certain features for even a doctrinal understanding of the category of "national security" as an object of public administration.

But this category is not so much scientific (theoretical) as practical. The very understanding of national security as a sphere for government administrative activity should reflect the set of measures and mechanisms that the state potentially requires to meet the needs of sustainable development. Therefore, "national security" as a phenomenon needs to be enshrined in law, and it is the legislative certainty that plays the most important role in the process of creating an appropriate policy to ensure national security.

Modern legislation of Ukraine in the field of national security, in particular the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" in the version of 2018 distinguishes between state and national security. Thus, state security is defined as "protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order and other vital national interests from real and potential threats of a non-military nature" and national security of Ukraine — as "protection of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic constitutional order and other national interests of Ukraine from real and potential threats." (Legislation of Ukraine, 2018). Such terminological uncertainty is incomprehensible in terms of the needs of national security, as it is not clear why state security is determined by the condition of ensuring security not related to the military (defence) component. In our opinion, this is a shortcoming of modern Ukrainian legislation in the field of national security, as it complicates the development of state policy and the practical implementation of many mechanisms and tools to overcome major security risks.

The above-mentioned law is also important because it determines the composition of the security and defence sector, which is a central element of the institutional support of public administration in the field of national security. Thus, the security and defence sector of Ukraine consists of four interrelated components: security forces; defence forces; defence industry complex; citizens and public associations that voluntarily participate in ensuring national security.

The second important act in the field of national security is the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, approved by Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 287/2015 dated 26.05.2015. Thus, the main strategic document in the field of national security of Ukraine is five years old. It contains threats and risks that were current at the time of its adoption, but in no way can take into account the strategic perspectives, i.e. risks and threats that are current in 2020, including the situation with the global pandemic caused by COVID-19, which could not have been foreseen in 2015. This means that Ukraine does not have any strategic document for overcoming the consequences of such a pandemic, and has failed to develop it in almost a year of the threat of this virus.

The current threats include the following:

- Russia's aggressive actions to exhaust the Ukrainian economy and undermine socio-political stability in order to destroy Ukraine and seize it;
- inefficiency of the system of national security and defence of Ukraine;
- corruption and inefficient public administration system;
- economic crisis, exhaustion of financial resources of the state, lower living standards;
- threats to energy security;
- threats to information security;
- threats to cybersecurity and security of information resources;
- threats to the security of critical infrastructure;
- threats to environmental security (Legislation of Ukraine, 2015a).

If you look at the fundamental research of scholars (Datsyuk et al., 2018; Ruban, 2019), you can see that in five years the effectiveness of the national security policy is extremely low, because one of the threats has not been overcome to the maximum possible extent, and the state of the national security system that exists today is characterized as "maintaining tactical advantages in the security sector."

The prevailing monopoly-oligarchic, low-tech, resource-intensive economic model in Ukraine really does not allow accumulating the necessary strategic resources to significantly improve the state of national security. Although there is currently no active hostilities in the phase in which they existed in 2014-2015, it is still inappropriate and premature to talk about ensuring stability. For example, the destruction of the economy and life support systems in the temporarily occupied territories, the loss of their human potential, and the illegal taking out of production assets to Russia persist and deepen. At the same time, restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine; integration into the European Union; special partnership with NATO — all this remains only strategic priorities of Ukraine. Moreover, no

progress has been made at the subregional level, where Ukraine continues to use existing formats — the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Group, GUAM, CEI, the BSEC, etc. — but does so extremely inefficiently.

Speaking of the state of national security, one cannot speak of its achievement only in the absence of active hostilities. We are talking about the restoration of sovereignty over all territories of the state, and therefore it is necessary to at least talk about strategic documents of a restorative nature, which do not exist today.

There is a new Military Doctrine in Ukraine; Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine; The Concept of the Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine (Legislation of Ukraine, 2015b; 2016a; 2016b), but the existence of these regulations is not a sufficient condition for ensuring the national security of Ukraine. These regulations demonstrate only the contours of the existing system of guidelines and strategic vision of the future state of the national security system. Today, Ukraine lacks strategic documents of, so to speak, the active tactical phase of restoring national security.

Indeed, the national security strategy is developed and adjusted taking into account the content of sectoral doctrines of national security. It reflects the goals and measures of implementation of the national security policy in different spheres. But on its basis, appropriate sectoral annual state programs should be developed with determination of state bodies responsible for their implementation (Dombrovska & Poltorak, 2015). There are no such programs today. It is also necessary to develop more aggressive strategies to restore state sovereignty, economic and social stability, international image and establishing a new quality of Ukraine's international legal personality. We emphasize that Ukraine must create and shape a new regional geopolitical space, become the center of such a space, and add new countries to it. In particular, in the conditions of active economic action of sanctions on the Russian Federation, there is a need to resume cooperation in a format that would unite the territorial neighbours of the Russian Federation, to which the latter has no territorial claims. We are talking, in particular, about the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan. These countries should not be considered as strategic partners of the Russian Federation, they have long been out of its sphere of influence, and therefore there is an urgent need to take advantage of this situation, and take the initiative to unite, at least tactically, these countries.

This is not an alternative to the Visegrad Group, in which Ukraine is not a full leader today, as it is at least inferior to Poland in economic terms, and is not the EU and NATO member, unlike the

countries of the Group. It is also wrong to hope for the restoration of the BSEC format, or the strategic importance of this format for Ukraine, because it includes the Russian Federation, which will never support Ukraine's security initiatives.

Ukraine must resume its activities in offering its weapons, military equipment and peacekeeping contingent for the needs of the UN and other international organizations. This will not only increase the combat capability of Ukrainian troops and provide an opportunity to get additional revenues to the State Budget of Ukraine, but also create the necessary image for Ukraine, restore allied relations with many countries which are remote from Eastern Europe, but have a real impact on geopolitical processes.

An extremely important direction of the national security policy is the fight against agents of influence of the Russian Federation, which currently occupy an important place in the system of economic and even public administration relations in Ukraine. It is a question of creation of such system of indicators of selection and filtering for loyalty/disloyalty of the Russian Federation which would provide actual and reliable information concerning hostile agents of influence, would make this information public. That would form the corresponding level of public distrust to those agents of influence. There is a need to intensify the institutions of civil society to combat external and internal enemies, in particular by developing educational programs of national patriotic education, their dissemination and implementation in all educational processes without exception. The concepts of inclusive education, civic education, democratic education — all of them should be implemented in the first place, and mainly taking into account the needs of national consciousness, which would ensure the unity of civilizational choice, increasing the level of political culture and public awareness, national identity.

To do this, it is necessary to develop and implement state sectoral and regional programs of socio-economic development, development programs of individual sectors, segments, sectors of the economy and the socio-humanitarian sphere. Such programs must be characterized by the availability of tools of active influence, even aggressive in relation to overcoming external threats to national security. The current political leaders of Ukraine lack the political culture, will and professional level for this. Unfortunately, it should be noted that the level of penetration of corruption into the economy of Ukraine has actually formed a parallel system of management decision-making on a national scale, where the center is the domestic oligarchy. The practicality and utility of any legal document will be fictitious, and the result will be virtually effective due to the lack of real interest or the



ability of political leaders to remove representatives of business elites from the center of political responsibility.

The main problem is that business elites make decisions based on the criteria of economic efficiency and profitability, therefore the actual implementation of most of the strategic priorities listed in the above regulations do not give them the desired economic effect. This is why the effectiveness of the modern system of public administration in the field of national security is extremely low, the nature of most strategic documents is general, and tactical plans are not implemented within the established time limits, or are absent in many sectors of socio-political and socio-economic relations. This situation adversely affects both the quality of public administration mechanisms and the system of national security goals, as the latter are subject to adjustment by business elites.

Summarizing the above, it is reasonable to present the following vision of the current state of development of the national security policy of Ukraine in the context of systemic changes in power relations in the geopolitical space (Figure 1).

Thus, we come to the conclusion that in current conditions Ukraine should focus on a multi-vector policy in the field of national security. The main directions of these vectors should be: accession to the global security system (NATO, UN); creation of a regional security environment chaired by Ukraine. In both directions, Ukraine must develop both bilateral relations, in particular with the most powerful allies in the face of Russian aggression (USA, Britain, Germany, etc.), as well as in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin (Turkey, Poland, Lithuania, etc.), as well as join existing groups and alliances (NATO, the Weimar Triangle, the Visegrad Group, etc.).




Figure 1. Conceptualization of the national security policy of Ukraine taking into account geopolitical transformations in the system of power relations

Discussion

The review of recent research in the field of public policy in the non-security sector shows that the above conclusions are quite common in the scientific community. For example, analysing the approaches to the organization of public administration in the field of national security of Ukraine, Ruban (2019) concludes that it is necessary to clarify the category of “national security of Ukraine” as an object of public administration influence. According to the researcher, the national security of Ukraine should be interpreted as “such a qualitative and quantitative condition of Ukrainian society, the state which is characterized by: the coordination of its interests with

public interests enshrined at the legislative level; protection from existing or expected threats of internal and external origin; the possibility of progressive and sustainable development and observance of the constitutional order, constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens.” Antonov (2018) also speaks about the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens as the central subject of national security policy: “The central place in security policy belongs to ensuring the right of citizens to a decent standard of living for themselves and their families established by Article 48 of the Constitution, as internal contradictions of socio-economic development of Ukraine and global crises provoke a number of real and potential threats in economic and social spheres,

and endanger the vital interests of society, its existence." But Ruban (2019) notes that today the most significant negative impact on the violation of constitutional rights, as well as the constitutional order of Ukraine is created not just by environmental factors of socio-economic nature, but by the direct destructive actions of foreign intelligence agencies in Ukraine, which penetrate into all political organizations and institutions without exception.

Rusnak and Khyzhniak (2015) and Stukalin (2016) also note such risks in their studies. Their main emphasis is on counteracting such intrusions into the system of public administration in the field of state defence by residents of foreign intelligence services. At the same time, researchers also pay attention to the need to form not only countermeasures and counterintelligence, but also to create a mirror system to counter the aggressive actions of foreign countries through the active use of intelligence in foreign policy.

The main problem is that, as Yarovoy (2019) points out, such countermeasures require political will, as well as the non-involvement of the political institutions of the modern Ukrainian state. Instead, there are risks of indirect lobbying influence for them. Shadow lobbyists can influence national security policy actors both directly and indirectly. Given this, an important component of the national security system should be the legalization of lobbying with the introduction of a reliable regulator of lobbying.

On the one hand, this approach seems too bold, as it actually legitimizes the outside influence of lobby groups on the bodies and state institutions involved in the national security system. On the other hand, as Zannier (2015) notes, the current Ukrainian crisis is the result of the fact that the legislative level has not regulated such phenomena of socio-political existence of any state as lobbying, antimonopoly policy, which would counteract the penetration of business elites in the political sphere, as well as the activities of the business elites themselves, through tools of severe restriction of the corporate sector and its influence on political processes. The same view is supported by Briand (2017), who notes that the Russian aggression against Ukraine became possible because of the lack of provisions in Ukrainian legislation that would limit the foreign lobby and the penetration of foreign agents of influence.

Analysing the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine as a result of multilayered rivalry in various sectors of the economy in combination with systemic errors and shortcomings of the socio-political system of Ukraine, Lakomy (2016) concludes that the first problem is the lack of stable and transparent projected development of Ukrainian legislation in a single vector of civilization development. We can draw the same conclusion from Menkiszak's (2016)

words: "Russia's war against Ukraine is Russia's desire to gain several satellite countries, including Ukraine, in opposition to the West. But Ukraine lacked legal certainty, including in the field of national security, to oppose Russian aggression". Indeed, the existence of the old Military Doctrine at that time, ineffective legislation, as well as organizational and legal support of the national security system — all this, according to Rondeaux (2019), is a shortcoming of any state and political system. But Klimenko (2018), as well as Rumer and Sokolsky (2019) emphasize that in addition to the laws, it is necessary to have state programs of sectoral and regional nature in all spheres of public relations and sectors of public administration. Sherr (2019) also notes this shortcoming, who writes that there are still no strategic sectoral programs in Ukraine that would focus on ensuring certain elements of national security, which greatly simplifies Russia's aggressive anti-Ukrainian policy.

In this context, Lewis (2020) notes that building a security environment for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is possible only if we understand the root causes of the confrontation between the West and Russia in the new Cold War. The researcher emphasizes that Russia is deriving a new instrumental formula for modern Russian messianism, built on four interrelated pillars: nationalism, nationwide chauvinism, Eurasianism, and politicized memory. The researcher also illustrates the mechanisms of such a policy on the example of Russian aggression not only against Ukraine but also against Syria. Developing this thesis, Keir (2017) concludes that Russia's foreign policy is a means of strengthening the domestic position of the ruling elite. At the same time, the researcher openly calls the Russian regime authoritarian and one that tends to return to the times of the Cold War.

Bryc (2019) focuses on Russia's attempts to reconsider the liberal world order regulated by the West. However, the challenge of the West seems to be a strategy aimed at improving Russia's international position. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambiguous, as Russia seeks rapprochement, particularly with the United States. The Russian Federation abandoned the West in 2014 as a result of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, in violation of international law, and participation in the war in eastern Ukraine. Russia, according to the researcher, has become a revisionist state that is trying to establish a post-Western world order. According to Hoffman (2018) and Sarotte (2017), this is the main threat to Ukraine's national security system. Researchers emphasize that Russia is trying to unilaterally reconsider the Ukraine's civilizational choice, and this is what Ukraine must resist with the help of regional leadership.

Monaghan (2019) sees Ukraine's greatest geopolitical potential in matters of national security,

in particular, in regional leadership, the creation of regional alliances, even situational ones. Ben-Ami (2017) maintains the same point of view in his research, considering the problem of creating regional alliances as one of the most effective trends in the future world order.

Georgiou and Rocco (2017) are more conservative in this context. As well as Lee (2017), who claims that the United States is developing a so-called "offshore leadership strategy": it seeks to remain the most influential (though not the only) leader, firmly establishing its sphere of influence in all regions of the world, trying to avoid direct (military contingent) interference in the internal affairs.

In this regard, Umbrasas (2017) notes that US influence and intervention in the conflict in eastern Ukraine can be seen as an example of offshore confrontation with the hybrid war, which is taking place in Russia's broader campaign of regional revisionism and global influence. The United States is not active in hostilities, but is using the potential for economic and financial sanctions. Thus, it remains Ukraine's most influential ally without a direct presence in the region. We support this thesis of researchers, while also paying attention to such an aspect of building a system for combating hybrid threats by Ukraine as regional leadership.

In this regard, Georgiou and Rocco (2017) believe that in the face of confrontation between the EU and Russia, NATO and Russia, the United States and Russia, a system of regional vacuum is being formed in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea basin. Today, Ukraine must actively fill this vacuum. Instead, the regional leaders are Poland and Turkey, respectively, which, in the context of global resistance to Russian aggression, create a separate security environment around Russia. Supporting confrontation in Belarus, Nagorno-Karabakh significantly reduce Russia's pressure not only on their own economic systems but also on Ukraine. In our opinion, Ukraine should be more active in geopolitical activities under these conditions.

De Maio (2016), Matsaberidze (2015) and Miarka (2019) consider the problem of improving the efficiency of public administration in the field of national security more broadly. They independently note that the source of Russia's aggression against Ukraine is the national interests of the former. Therefore, in order to successfully counter Russia's aggressive policy, Ukraine must be more aggressive in pursuing its own national interests.

The geographical space between the EU-Russia borders in the years after the end of the Cold War became the space of a unique surrogate for the clash of the liberal and communist worlds, which led to the ongoing Hybrid War in Ukraine and in Georgia (Darchiashvili & Bakradze, 2019). According to Dibb (2019), overcoming such regional geopolitical

problems reduces not only to the state's response to such aggressive policies, but also to the development of its own system of measures that would actively promote national interests in the confrontation for regional leadership.

Stuart and Roginska (2016) conclude that after a potentially difficult start, such a system of national security regulation can bring important benefits to Ukraine in the next few years due to improving public finance management, creating a more competitive and more efficient economy that directs its potential to meet the needs of national security, not counteracting but anticipating external threats (Tumkevič, 2018). Callinan (2019) as well as Rrustemi and Jovetic (2019) also emphasize this in their research, concluding that national security is the condition of functioning of the state, which is ensured by active, aggressive measures and mechanisms of state regulation that have proactive action, not just counteraction.

Conclusions

Summarizing the above, we come to the main conclusion that the modern system of public administration in the field of national security requires a number of systemic changes.

First, the system of regulatory and legal support of state policy in this area requires expansion through the development of sectoral acts, which would form the state security policy in a particular segment of public relations. This refers to state and regional development programs in a particular area, which would ensure the achievement of tactical goals in a particular segment of government regulation. When combined, they provided an integrated system of national security with a synergistic effect of combining different potentials which reveal in economic, social, humanitarian and other areas.

Second, it requires expansion of modern contours of security policy in Ukraine by developing and implementing more active (aggressive) mechanisms aimed not only at counteracting external threats, but also at promoting own national and civilizational interests in the geopolitical space. According to many researchers, the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation against Ukraine has its effectiveness largely due to the lack of mirror counter actions of Ukraine against Russia in particular. The policy of neutrality does not mean actions for the purposes of national development, but only the absence of the goals of military confrontation at the initiative of Ukraine. Therefore, a current active foreign policy should become an element of ensuring the national security system, which maximizes it through the effectiveness of geopolitical strategies and trends.

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