

## Parliamentary-presidential or presidential-parliamentary republic as modes of one political model or different concepts of government

*República parlamentaria-presidencial o presidencial-parlamentaria como modos de un modelo político o diferentes conceptos de gobierno*

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### Abstract

This research paper deals with the scientific research of institutional-procedural and behavioural attributes, principles and indicators of typology of mixed-type republics in European countries. The conducted scientific analysis gives grounds to argue that the defining directions in this context are the appeal to the problems of formation and activity of governments and the possibility of dissolving parliaments (i.e. scientific institutional and procedural differentiation of hybrid republican forms), dualism, legality and responsibility of executive bodies, as well as the index of presidential powers and the peculiarities of the dualism of the executive branch. On this basis, different factors and dimensions of the effectiveness of European semi-presidentialism proved that the analyzed form of government can be multi-vector, so we should study it collectively through comparisons. The author of the research substantiates that we should consider European semi-presidentialism both dispositively and as subjectively as possible. Moreover, from the perspective of legal comparativism, the advantage is the use of dispositional attributes and determining the type of mixed republic. So, it is obvious that a mixed republic is or may be heterogeneous, as different republics of mixed type demonstrate different forms of political practice within both identical and variable constitutional models, but within the same type of republican system of government. Therefore, a mixed republic is not a synthesis of separate elements of typical presidentialism and parliamentarism, but their combination, which transforms the form of government and generates individual constitutional and legal, as well as institutional and procedural features characteristic of this system of government. This proves that, even given the scope of the constitutional powers of political institutions in the “head of state — prime minister — parliament” triangle, semi-presidentialism in Europe is heterogeneous and variable, even balancing on the border of parliamentarism and presidentialism. Hence the conclusion that two republican modi form the mixed-type republic on the basis of constant transition from presidential-parliamentary to parliamentary-presidential republic.

**Keywords:** Semi-Presidentialism, Presidential-Parliamentary Republic, Parliamentary-Presidential Republic, Mixed Form and System of Government, Types of Semi-Presidentialism, Dualism of Executive Power.



## Resumen

Este trabajo de investigación trata de la investigación científica de atributos, principios e indicadores de tipología institucional-procedimental y de comportamiento de las repúblicas mixtas en países europeos. El análisis científico realizado da motivos para argumentar que las direcciones definitorias en este contexto son la apelación a los problemas de formación y actividad de los gobiernos y la posibilidad de disolución de los parlamentos (es decir, diferenciación científica institucional y procedimental de formas republicanas híbridas), dualismo, legalidad responsabilidad de los órganos ejecutivos, así como el índice de poderes presidenciales y las peculiaridades del dualismo del poder ejecutivo. Sobre esta base, diferentes factores y dimensiones de la efectividad del semipresidencialismo europeo demostraron que la forma de gobierno analizada puede ser multivectorial, por lo que debemos estudiarla de forma colectiva mediante comparaciones. El autor de la investigación fundamenta que deberíamos considerar el semipresidencialismo europeo tanto de forma dispositiva como subjetiva. Además, desde la perspectiva del comparativismo jurídico, la ventaja es el uso de atributos disposicionales y la determinación del tipo de república mixta. Entonces, es obvio que una república mixta es o puede ser heterogénea, ya que diferentes repúblicas de tipo mixto demuestran diferentes formas de práctica política dentro de modelos constitucionales tanto idénticos como variables, pero dentro del mismo tipo de sistema republicano de gobierno. Por tanto, una república mixta no es una síntesis de elementos separados del presidencialismo y el parlamentarismo típicos, sino su combinación, que transforma la forma de gobierno y genera rasgos individuales constitucionales y legales, así como institucionales y procesales característicos de este sistema de gobierno. Esto demuestra que, incluso dado el alcance de los poderes constitucionales de las instituciones políticas en el triángulo “jefe de Estado - primer ministro - parlamento”, el semipresidencialismo en Europa es heterogéneo y variable, incluso equilibrándose en la frontera del parlamentarismo y el presidencialismo. De ahí la conclusión de que dos modi republicanos forman la república de tipo mixto sobre la base de una transición constante de la república presidencial-parlamentaria a la parlamentaria-presidencial.

**Palabras clave:** semipresidencialismo, república presidencial-parlamentaria, república parlamentaria-presidencial, forma mixta y sistema de gobierno, tipos de semipresidencialismo, dualismo del poder ejecutivo.



## Introduction

The issue of choosing the vector of republican government is of European and global significance, and has become topical since the first half of the 90's of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. From that moment on, the scholars outlined the topic of the semi-presidential form of government on the basis of different methodological models, covered in scientific studies of international and regional cases in the works of Duverger (1980), Elgie (2018) and Erdem Aytac and Carkoglu (2018) determined the category of "public administration", in the context of a broader category — "government". Fernandes and Jalali (2017) studied the republican form of government as a form of government that emerged as a result of the evolution of society and conventionally recognized subjects of governance, designed to provide significant public life function on the basis of formalized rules. From the standpoint of Ganghof (2017), models of development of the republican form of government can be considered in the context of two basic fundamental models. The Eastern model brings the "common good" and collective interests to the fore in the system of goals of the state. In the Western model, the basis of state ideology is the individual good.

Besides, the influence of Western (American and European) political science is obvious, where they conclude about the definition of the terms of "form of government" and "system of government" that they combine such political phenomena as "semi-presidentialism", "parliamentarism", "presidentialism", which unite in the definition of "constitutional system of government". There are dichotomous and trichotomous scientific and methodological approaches to the study of constitutional government systems in the field of public administration. Besides, the dichotomy takes into account two categories of republican and monarchical government, such as the presidential and parliamentary forms of government. Conversely, the use of trichotomous scientific analysis involves the study of a parliamentary-presidential or presidential-parliamentary republic. Kim (2015) and Jung-Hsiang (2017) cover such scientific conceptualization of constitutional forms and systems of government in detail in their works.

Semi-presidentialism — as a constitutional component of the republican form of government — is characterized by the position of the president popularly elected for a term determined by law, as well as the prime minister and government, who are collectively accountable to parliament (prime minister and government may be collectively responsible to both parliament and the head of state, while ministers may have individual responsibilities to both the legislature and the president, but this has

no decisive effect on the definitive structure of the system of government).

As we can see, Elgie (2014) substantiated the logic of differentiation of three types of constitutional systems of republican government — presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary — is of a recommendatory nature for the theoretical distinction of forms of government.

As Sedelius and Linde (2018) point out in their scientific article, this is not just a synthesis of certain forms of government, it is the formation of a new institution — a republican hybrid. The number of presidential or parliamentary republics in the world increasingly reduces, while semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary ones emerge more and more often.

We believe that in classifying such varieties, it is necessary to say that they originate from the classical type of republican form of government and this concept unites them.

The author of this research is a supporter of the classical constitutional doctrine, which distinguishes between the presidential, parliamentary and mixed republic: parliamentary-presidential and presidential-parliamentary forms of government. In our opinion, this classification most accurately reflects the political and legal realities of today in the study of various types of modern republican forms of government.

We should note that the current trend in the development of many European countries is striving for eliminating the shortcomings of the presidential and parliamentary forms of government by establishing hybrid forms of government. Sartori notes that "a mixed form will be more perfect than a pure form", but calls the semi-presidential form of government "more appropriate" than parliamentary and more effective than the presidential one" (Sartori, 1997, p. 125).

## Methods and materials

Since the study focuses on determining the legal status of a parliamentary-presidential or presidential-parliamentary republic, the conceptual analysis explores the common and distinctive features of these forms of government.

The author used the logical-semantic method in the formulation of the conceptual framework, in the study and structuring of "semi-presidentialism" as a state legal category and the concept of a mixed system of government, as well as for empirical analysis of institutional and political features of interinstitutional relations in the "head of state — government — parliament" triangle in different European countries with a semi-presidential form of



government. The author applied sociological methods (content analysis, synthesis, discourse analysis, statistical ranking) of accumulation, rethinking and systematization of information.

The use of comparative historical method, in particular timeline retrospective one, allowed identifying and comparing the history of creation and approbation of semi-presidential form of government, as well as its different types and attributes in different European countries: cross-national analysis allowed comparing semi-presidentialism in the West, Central-East, Eastern Europe, etc., cross-temporal analysis of the interwar, postwar and modern period of formation of hybrid republican forms. The author identified and analysed institutional and political attributes, consequences of semi-presidential republican form of government through the prism of legal status, method of appointment and scope of powers of presidents, dualism of executive power, legitimacy and responsibility of executive power, as well as composition and procedure of termination of powers of legislatures.

Besides, the research involved transitological theories, which allowed to comprehensively consider the features of legal relations in the “head of the state — government — parliament” triangle from different perspectives. In addition, the work abounds in specific research tools of modern political science, especially in the form of comprehensive qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis.

The complexity of scientific research is due to the fact that, on the one hand, it is impossible to conduct a comparative analysis without theoretical data, on the other — it is impossible to form an integrated concept without the empirical results of the analysis. Besides, there are many problems of theoretical and methodological nature, in particular, the problem of comparative analysis: “many cases — few variables”, selection bias, Galton’s analytical neutrality, which must be solved in order to ensure quality comparative research.

In turn, the diversity of studies is due to the fact that there are different comparative forms of research (case studies, binary studies, cross-temporal and cross-regional studies) (Hague, Harrop & Breslin, 1998), as well as different research strategies — with a focus on theoretical data and with a focus on empirical data (Feijó, 2016), which differ in both methodological and empirical efficiency and are used in comparative analysis of the forms of government.

The objective of the research is to carry out the typologization of forms of hybrid republican government by determining the procedure and methods of appointment (election) and the foundations of the legitimacy of the presidential institution; outline the system of relations between the president and the legislative and executive bodies. Another objective is to differentiate between

presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential forms of government in order to find out whether they belong to the same political model or to different concepts of government.

### Research Design

The study involved several stages, each stage aimed at achieving the corresponding analytical objective. At each stage of the study the intermediate results were systematized upon achieving the objectives, and in the final stage of the study the overall results were tested using empirical data processing methods.

According to the research design, at the first stage (January - February 2020) the author analysed philosophical, psychological, pedagogical, political, and legal sources to study the existing scientific approaches to the concept of “presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential republic”. At the next stage (March-May 2020), the author presented own vision of the structure of relations in the semi-presidential republics, developed proposals to increase the efficiency of the synthesis of republican forms of government. The final stage (June 2020) involved drawing reasoned conclusions, which were the result of long research.

### Results


According to the procedure of redistribution of powers between the executive and the legislative power, they distinguish presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential forms of government. A republic is presidential if the president is publicly elected for a fixed term and independently forms, heads and dismisses the government. If the government is accountable only to parliament and there is no president, or he is the formal head of state and is elected by indirect vote — the system is parliamentary. If the president is elected by popular vote, but the cabinet of ministers is accountable to parliament — the system is considered semi-presidential. Among the semi-presidential republican forms, they distinguish parliamentary-presidential (premier-presidential) and presidential-parliamentary forms of government, depending on who has the power to appoint and dismiss the government. The essence of the constitutional attributes of semi-presidentialism is that, as Duverger (1980) noted, at least three types of inter-institutional division of powers can be constitutionally established (Figure 1).

The most common forms of government are parliamentary (65 states) and presidential (50 states). Parliamentary are mainly the constitutional monarchies of Western Europe and the former British colonies, the typical presidential republics are the United States, most of Latin America and Central Asia. Presidential and parliamentary republics (21) are located in Africa, many post-Soviet states and the Middle East. Parliamentary-presidential republics (31), in addition to France, are particularly common in southern Africa and Central and Eastern Europe.



This classification does not apply to all countries. For example, absolute monarchies preserved in most countries of the Arabian Peninsula, while Vietnam and China are special systems of one-party rule. At the same time, the republican form of government does not necessarily imply that the country is


democratic. According to Economist Intelligence Unit (2019), the presidential-parliamentary republic — the Russian Federation — and the presidential republic — Venezuela — are typical authoritarian states. But even in such authoritarian countries, political institutions depending on the form of government can have some influence.



**Figure 1.** Types of inter-institutional division of powers according to Duverger (1980)

As Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power (2017) and Beuman (2015) note, the form of configuration of the parliamentary majority, as well as the party affiliation of major political institutions determine the choice of the presidential or prime ministerial phase of semi-presidentialism. The consequence is a different position of the institution of the head of state in

different configurations from the role of “hyper-president”, who has significantly more power than the president of a classical presidential republic, or “weak” president, who has less power than the head of state of a classical parliamentary republic (Figure 2).



**Figure 2.** Distribution of power in the presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential republic

Given the need to introduce a unified approach to the differentiation of the parliamentary-presidential and presidential-parliamentary republics, it is necessary to develop approaches to assessing such a general criterion for systematizing mixed republican forms as the level of presidential influence. One of the elements of such an assessment is the number of persons representing the presidential institution. According to this criterion, presidential forms of government are divided into individual and collegial

(Molder, 2014). An example of a collegial presidential body is the experience of the Hungarian Presidential Council. This collegial presidential body existed until 1989. As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, a collegial presidential body emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina —collegial Presidium consisting of Bosniak, Serb and Croat, succeeding each other as chairman of this collegial body.



The strength of presidential influence determines the presidential-parliamentary forms, which scholars call “hyper-presidential”, which provide for an extraordinary concentration of power by the presidential institution. In such states, the parliament plays the role of an advisory body that makes only those decisions that the president recommends. The list of mixed republics with hypertrophied scope of presidential powers includes not only Latin American countries but also post-Soviet countries. Derbyshire J. and Derbyshire I. (1996) proposed simpler classification of presidential republican forms, they divide hybrid republican forms into limited and unlimited.

Because scholars often note that “states with strong centralized power, which usually tends to despotism usually establish in large but socially integrated areas”. Therefore, we propose another criterion for

classifying semi-presidential forms — the geographical location of countries.

However, all these classification criteria do not allow to compare all the republics of the mixed type, so one of the most effective criteria is the strength of the influence of the presidential institution, which depends on the scope of president’s powers. This category and the indices of its measurement are determined in different ways. We apply the method of comparative studies, comparing the scope of constitutional powers of presidents of different countries. Among foreign researchers of democratic and transitional state regimes and the formation of constitutional forms of public administration, Horowitz (1990) and Lijphart (2014) fundamentally dealt with comparing the constitutional powers of the president (Table 1).

**Table 1** Presidential powers in the world.

	<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>Romania</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>Brazil</b>
<b>Leading role in forming the government</b>	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Leading role in foreign policy</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Use of decrees</b>	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited	Wide	Limited	Wide
<b>The right of legislative initiative</b>	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Veto/number of deputies to abolish</b>	Yes 2/3	Yes 3/5	Yes 50%+1	Yes 50%+1	Yes 2/3	Yes 2/3	Yes 50%+1
<b>Cancellation of government decisions</b>	Yes (until the Constitutional Court renders its judgement)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Extensive constituent powers</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Determining position in the appointment of Prosecutor General</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Appointment of local executive officials</b>	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No

None of the studied forms of government is unquestionably perfect. Each has its disadvantages and advantages, which are influenced by other components of the political mechanism (for example, elections and the party system). Scholars continue to study the trends of the influence of one or another

form of government on the country’s success in the field of economic and social development.

Earlier, they believed that presidential-parliamentary systems excessively accumulate and personalize power or are characterized by conflicts between the






president and parliament, between government and public institutions, the appointment of incompetent people to the positions, and so on.

Other hybrid republican forms of government have their shortcomings, too. For example, a parliamentary-presidential republic with one party in power promotes a more effective policy, but can usurp power exercised by the prime minister and ignore the political interests of the minority. A parliamentary-presidential republic with a large number of parties fully takes into account the diversity of political interests and needs in society, but complicates the formation of the cabinet of ministers. Semi-presidential forms of government involve mutual control by the president, the head of

government and parliament, but cause frequent political conflicts over the division of powers.

In post-socialist countries, presidential and presidential-parliamentary forms of government, however, balance on the verge of excessive concentration of power, levelling of political competition and the decline of democratic institutions. Some leading scholars, in particular Taghiyev (2006) argues that significant concentration of power in the hands of the president, especially in a post-Soviet authoritarian society, in the absence of checks and balances, blocks the formation of independent political parties and public institutions. Figure 3 shows the current indicators of the index of presidential powers of individual countries.



**Figure 3.** Current indicators of the index of presidential (Sedelius & Linde, 2018)

Analysing the data in Figure 1, we conclude that the scope of powers and influence of the president on political processes in the state does not correspond to the chosen form of government. The index of presidential powers in classical presidential republics may be lower than in parliamentary-presidential ones. That is, we can speak of a single mixed form of republican government, and the degree of “parliamentarism” or “presidentialism” can vary within one state and one historical stage of its development, depending on the social and psychological characteristics of the person holding the presidency, and also on the features of mentality and history of statehood development. We should take conclusions on the causal relationship between the form of government and indicators of socio-economic development of the state with a grain of salt. It is very difficult to separate the influence of the form of government from other factors of development. For example, the failures of presidential-parliamentary countries in Latin America correspond to non-institutional factors — political activity of illegal military formations or geopolitical factors. Against the background of the economic crisis and political instability in Chile, Mexico and Argentina, military formations were characterized by

a high level of professionalism and discipline and repeatedly gained power during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Realizing the danger of the spread of communist ideas in the region after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States ignored these processes and sometimes supported military regimes economically and diplomatically, and increased their chances of victory.

It can be debated whether this form of government in post-socialist countries has led to the concentration of power in the hands of a strong president, or, conversely, the heads of state who have already concentrated a wide range of powers have chosen the appropriate form of government.

### Discussion

Thus, analysing the data of the research, we can say with confidence that one of the latest trends in world constitutional practice is the convergence of forms of government. Mixed forms of government as modi of one political model in their various modifications allow forming the system of separation of powers the most acceptable for the state, combining the advantages of presidential and parliamentary models,



taking into account the features and traditions of the state. As in all other countries, there is a legislative, executive and judicial branch of government. The head of state — the president, who is not formally a member of any branch of government, takes the central place in the system of state bodies.

According to researchers of mixed forms of government, in practice there is often a danger of disturbing the necessary balance of power, which either leads to parliamentary dominance, creating instability and crisis, or entails the rule of the executive, leading to authoritarianism or dictatorship. Elimination of such a danger and ensuring equality of legislative and executive branches of government requires the institution of an arbitrator president. The president in mixed republics is elected directly by the citizens. He ensures compliance with the constitution, the proper functioning of state bodies and the succession of state power. The president has the right to appoint the prime minister, as well as from other members of the government on his proposal. The government is politically accountable to parliament (unlike the president), which can apply vote of no confidence to him. In such a case, the president may dissolve the representative body and call new elections, but the newly elected parliament may not be dissolved again in the year following the election.

At the same time, the independence of the government is ensured by the institution of countersignature, which provides for the consent of the prime minister to certain acts of the head of state. Art. 19 of the Constitution of the French Republic of 1958 contains a general rule that the acts of the President of the Republic are countersigned by the Prime Minister and, if necessary, by the responsible ministers, except as specified in the same article. Counter-signature is required for prolongation of laws, appointment to civilian and military positions, accreditation of ambassadors, pardon.

Let us also note that the executive power in a mixed model of separation of powers is dual (bicephalic). It is divided between the president and the government. Moreover, when the president and prime minister belong to different political camps, situations of “multi-vector rule” may arise. The whole mechanism of the mixed model of separation of powers aims at making the work of the state apparatus as efficient as possible, which is facilitated by the cooperation between the legislative and the executive branches. Such cooperation is ensured by a strong presidential power endowed with special powers of coordination and arbitration. Accordingly, the main features of the system of checks and balances in these countries are the following: the president is not formally part of any branch of government, being a kind of arbiter who rises above them; the president is not politically accountable to parliament, but has the power to dissolve it early; the president appoints the prime minister and participates in the formation of the government; members of the government cannot be

members of the highest representative body (parliament) at the same time; the government is politically accountable to both parliament and the president.

It is established that the model of a mixed republic was first tested during the reform of the system of public administration in Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Iceland, but the scientific substantiation and conceptualization of semi-presidentialism bases on the experience of France. Presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential forms of government need constant improvement and still require significant theoretical and empirical modifications, but a better form of government has not been proposed either at the theoretical or practical level, so the mixed republic remains the dominant model of government in European countries (especially Central-Eastern and South-Eastern).

Therefore, it is important to attribute and typologize the presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential republics and their institutional-procedural and political-behavioural parameters for the development and improvement of research on the legal status of republics and their main types.

As a result, in order to eliminate the shortcomings and to take into account the positive elements of both classical and postclassical approaches to the differentiation of semi-presidentialism, the result of scientific research was its conceptualization based on a synthetic approach. In particular, the model of a mixed republic, the separate concepts of which are presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential republics, is outlined as a system of government which combines three obligatory and objectified attributes (Figure 4).

As a result, it is argued that the political model of a mixed republic is a unique, multi-vector and heterogeneous system of government, and therefore should be subject to a comprehensive analysis and typologization.

This is important because different modi of the mixed republican model, having advantages and disadvantages and generating different risks and prospects, can differently model the development of interinstitutional relations, political process, dynamics of political regime, ensure political stability and socio-economic development.


Accordingly, the analysis of the legal status of a mixed republic should be carried out as a comparison of the effectiveness of its individual modi (presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential) instead of interpreting it as a whole. At the same time, the typologization and taxonomy of a mixed republic should be based on the diversity of conditions and procedures for adopting constitutions, methods and forms of responsibility of the government and the prime minister, subjects of





executive power in the state, diversification of the political composition of parliament. And scientific methods of research of separate modi of the mixed republic should be formalized and institutional (for research of formation and responsibility of

governments), behaviourist (concerning dualism, legal certainty and responsibility of executive power), and institutional-procedural (concerning strength of powers of presidents and realization of dualism of executive power), that is, complex and diverse.



**Figure 4.** Mandatory attributes of the conceptual model of a mixed republic

Moreover, the system of political majority and opposition within the framework of European semi-presidentialism is methodologically contradictory. On the one hand, such a system can reduce the efficiency of the political process and governance, as it generates conflict situations in the “head of state — cabinet of ministers — parliament” triangle, but on the other — multi-party control over inter-institutional relations, efficiency of the executive vertical and the development of political process is the most effective, complies with the principles of separation of powers and is a means of balancing, checking and counterbalancing. It is also established that a mixed republic can develop in the form of a unified government - quasi-presidentialism or quasi-parliamentarism. Therefore, very often, the constitutions of many countries state that the republic is presidential-parliamentary, or parliamentary-presidential, but political practice balances from parliamentary through semi-presidential to presidential republic. After all, a mixed republic is capable of a flexible bilateral course — with a tendency to domination of a strong leader, who can be both president and head of government or parliament, which determines the personalization of power and a dynamic change of government without amending the constitution.

At the present historical stage, it is advisable to distinguish hybrid republican systems with the position of strong (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Turkey) president and weak head of the government and parliament, and vice versa — with

the institution of weak (Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Czech Republic, Croatia), and even nominal (Ireland, Macedonia, Serbia, Finland) president and a strong prime minister and parliament, as well as balanced mixed republican systems (balanced mixed republic — Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, France, Croatia). Moreover, it is motivated that among the mixed republics there are most often republics with a strong prime minister and parliament, less often — balanced in terms of powers, and least often — republics with a strong president.


Analysing the data of the research, we note that the term “mixed republic” does not form any research and practical continuum. Lijphart (1997) notes that a mixed republic “is a multi-vector concept that “represents an intermediate distance between presidentialism and parliamentarism.” Instead, Fernandes and Jalali (2017) insist on distinguishing two independent modi of mixed republic “movement from presidentialism to parliamentarism” — the system of government, which researchers consider as “analogous to semi-presidentialism”, it is characterized by the placement of government “on a way along the political continuum” from presidentialism to parliamentarism and the “movement from a parliamentary system of government to a presidential one.”

Therefore, according to the authors, a mixed republic is not a goal, it is a pendulum path, constant fluctuations of political forces due to the scope and influence of the president, and these characteristics



do not depend on the constitutional powers of the president, but on the leadership qualities of the

occupier of the president's position, as well as its support from political parties and citizens (Figure 5).



**Figure 5.** Mixed republic model (Pendulum Theory): 1. Balance point; 2. Parliamentary-presidential republic; 3. Presidential-parliamentary republic

The amplitude of the pendulum oscillation is a set of points, each being a separate unique model of the form of government. The state can move from the point of balance to two opposite modi. The first modus is conditionally characterized by the primacy of the prime minister over the president, in particular regarding the exercise of executive power, and the second — the primacy of the president over the prime minister.

However, as Sartori (1994) noted, selection of these modi is quite conditional, and sometimes artificial. At the same time, the scholar argued that “sequence involves the transition from one state to another.” In this regard, Sartori (2004) and Fortin (2013) note and justify that mixed republican systems of government base on variable republican forms within the same constitutional model. Therefore, a mixed republic is not a synthesis of separate elements of typical presidentialism and parliamentarism, but their combination, which transforms the form of government and generates individual constitutional and legal, as well as institutional procedural features characteristic of this system of government.

### Conclusions

Thus, the author's pendulum theory, which involves evaluating such a criterion for classifying mixed republican forms as the index of influence of the presidential institution, allows not only to compare the strength of this institution in hybrid republics, but also to assess the prospects of movement from presidential-parliamentary form of government to parliamentary-presidential and vice versa.

The proposed approach to assessing the impact of the presidential institution allows predicting possible dependence of changes in the presidential, parliamentary and mixed republics on the value of this criterion. And even anticipate possible political crises and conflicts in the country. This research established that the problem of choosing the form of government, in particular its common model in European countries — a republic of mixed type, is one of the determinants in the process of functioning and development of states.

Finally, balanced republican forms of mixed type do not provide for the dominance of the presidential powers of the president, the speaker of parliament or the prime minister, but are based on the principles of stable or situational balance between political institutions, and therefore block governmental and constitutional conflict in the executive branch, especially no political party is guaranteed a parliamentary majority during elections.

Hence the conclusion is that a republic of mixed type is formed by two republican modi, on the basis of a constant movement from the presidential-parliamentary to the parliamentary-presidential republic. That is why it has unlimited opportunities for development and consolidation of democracy, because being in constant search of an ideal balanced model of government, being flexible and dynamic, a mixed republic is able to eliminate conflicts in the system of dualism of executive power characteristic of other republican forms.

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