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Abstract
Event is one of the key ontological categories actively studied in several sciences. The article is concerned with analyzing and comparing the definitions and criteria of event within the narratives of various philosophers, many of which relied on linguistic material (Z. Vendler, B. Hennig, A.P.D. Mourelatos, K. Gill and others). Linguistic and logical methods are used. The task of the work is to distinguish between event and thing, state, and especially process as the closest ontological type. In addition, the work explores event approaches that are appertain on narratology (M. Bal, J. Lotman, W. Schmid and others). We have singled out the key criteria for event: spatio-temporal boundaries, change, heterogeneity, instantaneousness, the presence of a result, the presence of an evaluating subject, the presence of epistemological grounds for isolation, extraordinariness. In the paper the correlation and consistency of these criteria are proved. We pinpoint the criterion of heterogeneity: event requires a qualitative heterogeneity of states before and after a certain point in time. The trends in the interpretation of events that are characteristic of analytical and continental philosophy are indicated. The specificity of the approach to event in narratology is investigated. In particular, in narratology, situational, philosophical, socio-cultural significance, subjectivity, and also the criterion of extraordinariness are of particular concern. Event appears in narratology not as something given in its finished form, but as a result of narrative construction, although based on objectively existing premises.

Keywords: Philosophy, Narratology, Event.

El evento es una de las categorías ontológicas clave estudiadas activamente en varias ciencias. El artículo trata sobre el análisis y la comparación de las definiciones y los criterios del evento dentro de las narraciones de varios filósofos, muchos de los cuales se basaron en material lingüístico (Z. Vendler, B. Hennig, A.P.D. Mourelatos, K. Gill y otros). Se utilizan métodos lingüísticos y lógicos. La tarea del trabajo es distinguir entre evento y cosa, estado y especialmente proceso como el tipo ontológico más cercano. Además, el trabajo explora enfoques de eventos relacionados con la narratología (M. Bal, J. Lotman, W. Schmid y otros). Hemos seleccionado los criterios clave para el evento: límites espacio-temporales, cambio, heterogeneidad, instantaneidad, la presencia de un resultado, la presencia de un sujeto evaluador, la presencia de bases epistemológicas para el aislamiento, lo extraordinario. En el trabajo se demuestra la correlación y la consistencia de estos criterios. Identificamos el criterio de heterogeneidad: el evento requiere una heterogeneidad cualitativa de estados antes y después de cierto punto en el tiempo. Se indican las tendencias en la interpretación de eventos que son característicos de la filosofía analítica y continental. Se investiga la especificidad del enfoque del evento en narratología. En particular, en narratología, la importancia situacional, filosófica, sociocultural, la subjetividad y también el criterio de lo extraordinario son de particular interés. El evento aparece en la narratología no como algo dado en su forma terminada, sino como resultado de la construcción narrativa, aunque basada en premisas objetivamente existentes.

Palabras clave: Filosofía, Narratología, Evento.
Introduction

If we need to denote things and then denote events, we will point out on the same material. Events and processes, on the one hand, and things, on the other, are only two different modi of considering the same reality. Philosophy being in close union with linguistics has been researching the typology of ontological meanings expressed in language through verbs for several decades. In addition to philosophy and linguistics, other disciplines, including narratology, research into event. Many narratologists define narrative as a representation of a sequence of events, therefore, event is one of the important concepts in this discipline (Rimmon-Kenan, 1983; Prince, 2012; Bal, 1997; Schmid, 2010; Oveisi et al., 2018a; Rasooli & Abedini, 2017). Paul Ricoeur and David Herman define narrative as a cognitive instrument of acquiring temporal experience (Ricoeur, 2010; Herman, 2011; Oveisi et al., 2018b; Kamberov et al., 2017). In the present paper, we compare the criteria to differentiate between the events that philosophers write about, on the one hand, and narratologists, on the other hand. We analyze the mutual relationships of the proposed definitions. In addition, we offer our own criterion to reinforce existing approaches.

Materials And Methods

We apply hypotheses about the criteria of differentiation which can be used as the basis for the definition, language material and check whether this or that distinguishing corresponds to the usual use of the word “event”. In addition, logical analysis of different criteria and their relationships is carried out in the paper. In one way or another, most of the philosophers who are primarily the representatives of analytical philosophy and whose opinions we give follow a similar method. In this vein, we analyze the definitions and criteria of event formulated by various philosophers and narratologists.

Some authors take its spatial and temporal framework as the basis for highlighting event. In this case, event turns out to be a four-dimensional object (Quine, 1960; Goodman, 2012; Bennett, 1988). Lawrence Lombard believes that the ontological basis of an event is change (Lombard, 2019). Boris Hennig divides all “occurrences” into two main types: extended in time and instant. The examples of the first type are to perform gastroscopy, to look for a ballpoint pen, and to know. The example of the second type is to complete a gastroscopy, to find a ballpoint pen, to get to know. Hennig formulates an important thesis regarding the correlation of these two ontological types: instantaneous “occurrences” are the points of the beginning or the end of “occurrences” extended in time (Hennig, 2008).

Zeno Vendler identifies four types of verbs, applying this classification to the meanings that stand for them: “activities”, “accomplishments”, “achievements” and “states”. Thus, according to Vendler’s classification, two types - “accomplishment” and “achievement” are in correlation with the concept of “event”. What Vendler calls “achievements” happens instantly, without taking up a length of time, although it may take time to make this transformation possible. The examples: to get to know, to find, to win, to start, to finish, to be born, to die. “Accomplishments” also have a key point, after which you can talk about them as achieved, but this point is preceded by a length of time, which also includes the corresponding verb or phrase: to run a mile, to draw a circle, to make a chair, to grow up, to recover (Vendler, 1967). A similar classification is offered by Anthony Kenny. He also distinguishes between “activity” and “state”, but instead of
“accomplishment” and “achievement” Vendler writes about one type: “performance” (Kenny, 2003).

Alexander P. D. Mourelatos proposes the contrast of homogeneity / heterogeneity as a criterion for distinguishing between processes and states (homogeneity), on the one hand, and events (heterogeneity), on the other hand. Another criterion is closely connected with this criterion: events are delimited from one another, therefore, they can be counted, and in processes any part is similar to any other part, as well as to the whole (Mourelatos, 1978).

Some researchers consider the presence of a certain result achieved at a certain point in time in the unfolding of changes to be another reason for distinguishing between events and processes (Galton, 1984; Parsons, 1990; Smith, 2013; Agara, 2017).

Kathleen Gill suggests interpreting the differences between events and processes as related more to the field of epistemology than to ontology. According to this scholar, the presence of the resulting point ontologically is not a privilege of event: any point is the result of earlier ones. However, not all points are equally important for us: due to natural and socio-cultural factors, our principal concern will be with some of them, and these factors being external to the ontological properties proper create a distinction between processes and events in our minds (Gill, 1998).

Narratologists also study event. Mieke Bal defines event in the context of a task to define a narrative text. She characterizes event as “the transition from one state to another state” (Bal, 1997). Yuriy Lotman defines event as the movement of a character across the boundary of a semantic field (Lotman, 1977). Valery Tyupa identifies three basic requirements for the event: heterogeneity, localization in space and time, intelligibility (someone should think and say about the event) (Tyupa, 2001). Wolf Schmid identifies the following event conditions for literary narrative. The main criteria are relevance (an event should be significant for the world in which it occurs) and unpredictability. Additional criteria is consistency (an event should have an impact on the thoughts and actions of the character), irreversibility and non-repeatability (Schmid, 2010).

Results And Discussion

It seems that almost all of these approaches do not contradict each other, on the contrary, they form a single whole. The correlation and interconnection of these criteria is seen by us as follows.

The spatio-temporal criterion does not allow to distinguish events from other ontological types (thing, process, etc.), therefore, it is not very important for our purposes. But it does not contradict the rest.

The category of “change” is not limiting and can be reduced to the dissimilarity of something at different points in time, that is, heterogeneity and change are related to each other. Wendler’s “Achievement” is close to Hennig’s “instantaneous”. In the type of “accomplishment” there are a time interval during which changes occur and a point in time at which changes end; this endpoint is also similar to Hennig’s “instantaneous”.

The similarity of M. Bal’s approach with Lombard’s idea of change as the ontological essence of the event is obvious. In addition, M. Bal’s definition closely echoes Hennig’s idea of instantaneous “occurrents” as the points of boundaries between “occurrents” over time and the heterogeneity of states before and after a certain point (Mourelatos).
Unpredictability, non-repeatability, randomness (Lotman and Schmid) can be considered as the factors enhancing heterogeneity. The idea of heterogeneity also correlates with the idea of result: the point of achievement of the result divides the time into “before” and “after”.

The concept of “homogeneity” as applied to processes needs to be clarified. Barry Taylor points out that sometimes it is truly complete homogeneity, as is the case with the rotation of the planets. But sometimes what we designate a process consists of different parts that form a certain cycle, as in cases with laughter, speaking, playing tennis, etc (Taylor, 1986). Jill objects to this, that is, for example, it is difficult to distinguish some repeating structural elements for some complex processes, for the evolution of biological species or the transformation of political institutions (Gill, 1998). Anna Polakof defends the viewpoint according to which the event should be continuous (Wendler’s event of “accomplishment” type is meant), the presence of break makes us talk about two different events (Polakof, 2017). Gill and Polakof, in our opinion, miss the fact that any concept is more or less based on abstraction, which implies distraction from most aspects of the phenomenon with concentration on a small number of them. In the concept of the process, one or another homogeneity of the elements of what is happening comes to the fore. For example, in laughter, all sounds are generated by the same psychological state, in construction, all actions are united by purpose, in the democratization of the political regime, the ability of citizens to influence power increases, etc. This does not mean that the individual elements of each of these processes are also homogeneous otherwise. Thus, the concept of process, like the concept of state, is indeed based on accentuation of homogeneity, and the concept of event emphasizes heterogeneity in the same phenomena.

The criterion of homogeneity can be better understood through the principle of correlation of quantitative and qualitative changes (Hegel, 2014). Within certain limits of quantitative changes the same quality can be preserved, which, of course, is only one of the many possible ways of looking at an object. After a certain limit of quantitative changes, quality disappears, lengthening into some other quality. Qualitative change is, in fact, understood as the entry of an object into a new class of objects to which it did not belong before. Qualitative change makes it possible for the subject to participate in connections, relations, and processes that were previously impossible for it. For example, the ripened fruit of a plant is able to give life to a new plant; the assembled car is able to drive; you can cross a river over frozen water, etc. The concept of qualitative change correlates with the ideas about the events of Vendler, Mourelatos and Hennig.

The relevance criterion (Schmid) refers us to the significance of the factors that determine what to consider to be an event and what not: compare K. Jill’s statement about the epistemological foundation rather than the ontological foundation of event. Lotman also makes event being dependent not so much on the ontological as on the epistemological aspect of the reality: in order to see event, one must first create such a grid of semantic fields in which such an event becomes possible. Event will be what becomes the most important in terms of the semantics of a particular literary work (Lotman, 1977). Thus, event is constructed in the literary text in two senses: the author not only creates a fictional reality but also rethinks the priorities in it. In this case, the interpretation of event in narratology approaches the tendency that is characteristic of continental philosophy: event is not any change, but only something that is very important, something that brings
significant changes to the world. An example of this approach is Alen Badiou’s concept (Badiou, 2007).

One more meaning issues from the criteria of importance and situational significance: for an event, the subject who feels its significance is important. According to Alexander Sekatsky, event can occur only where the subject is endowed with autonomous will. The event is carried out only by one who can commit risky and reckless deeds. For example, a mythological character who goes fighting with the gods. From here two fundamental aspects of eventuality stem: flight and catastrophic: “An event, like everything genuine, is catastrophic; for it to take place, you need to get out of watch, get insolence ... and take flight” (Sekatsky, 2016). Only the subject is capable of capturing irrevocable and even tragic changes in himself and, contrary to everything, carry out a swift movement towards the source of fear.

Vadim Rudnev also makes a demarcation between event and a non-event using phenomenological approach, highlighting three conditions. First, the presence of anthropomorphic consciousness is essential. Actions that occur with an inanimate object (“thing”) that cannot speak, analyze and evaluate will not be considered genuine events. Second, there should be sweeping changes in personality’s position, for example, in his world outlook. Secondly, large-scale changes must occur with a person, for example, in a worldview (Rudnev, 2007). Third, the narrative: “Event can only become an event when it is described as an event.” This idea, as already mentioned, is expressed by Tyupa, as well as by Paul Ricoeur (Ricoeur, 2010). Thus, event turns out to be closely connected with thinking, goal-setting and the narrative as a form of acquiring experience.

Summary

Based on the study, the following criteria can be singled out to distinguish an event from what it is not.

1. Event as an object that has certain boundaries in space and time (Quine, Goodman, Bennett, Tyupa).
2. Change as an ontological foundation of event (Lombard, Bal, Lotman).
3. Differentiation between homogeneity and heterogeneity as the basis for differentiation between processes and events (Mourelatos, Taylor, Tyupa).
4. Event is a separate cohesive unit (Mourelatos).
5. Distinction between what happens instantly and what is continuous in time (Vendler, Hennig), as well as the statement that the phenomena of the first type are the boundaries between the phenomena of the second type (Hennig).
6. The presence in events of a certain result which was not before the event (Galton, Parsons, Smith).
7. Unpredictability, non-repeatability, contingency of event (Lotman, Schmid).
8. Event should become the subject of thought and speech of a person (Ricoeur, Tyupa).
9. Separation of an event from a single causal stream of reality as an epistemological phenomenon rather than an ontological one, depending on the worldview and situation (Gill, Lotman, Schmid, Tyupa).

10. Event is an important, extraordinary change (Badiou, Sekatsky, Rudnev).

The criteria of eventivity such as change, transition to another state, heterogeneity, effectiveness, instantaneousness do not contradict each other on the whole but constitute a single whole. They can be reduced to a qualitatively different state of the same object at two different points in time, or, more simply, to a qualitative change. These criteria are studied primarily in analytical philosophy.

The second group of criteria is connected with thinking, epistemological, socio-cultural factors, with the subjective, existential significance of event. These criteria are more analyzed in continental philosophy and are important for narratology.

Both groups of criteria do not contradict each other. Qualitative heterogeneity of the state of an object in time exists objectively, but its selection as something worth thinking and talking about stems from the situation in which the subject is.

Conclusions

Event can be generated by human actions or natural factors, but in order for us to call something an event, the material must be realized, become an object of thought, appreciation, story. It is the subject who determines which aspect of the heterogeneity of the world should be paid attention to as something significant, claiming the status of an event. Despite the fact that change as the ontological basis of event exists in the objective reality, consciousness plays an important role in the construction of a certain ontological modus of thinking about reality: events, processes, things, properties, etc. This becomes especially noticeable when analyzing such a phenomenon as narrative based on the selection of information and the construction of a holistic story united by a certain position which reflects the social, cultural, physical, cognitive and other features of a particular subject.

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References


